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Abstract
The formidable economic growth of China in the past few decades led to outstanding
improvements in virtually all objective indicators of standards of life. However, these
objective records are in striking contrast with subjective ones. Between 1990 and 2007,
Chinese average subjective well-being substantially declined. Using data from the World
Values Survey, this paper identifies the predictors of the trend of life satisfaction in China
between 1990 and 2007. Our findings suggest that subjective data capture something that
objective data miss and that can explain the decrease in well-being: the increase in the
importance of social comparisons and the decline of social capital. Moreover, economic
growth resulted in higher well-being inequality: those in the lowest three income deciles
and the middle-class experienced a significant reduction in well-being, whereas the latter
increased among richer people. Differences in the erosion of social capital and in the
impact of social comparisons seem to be the key to well-being differences among classes.
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1 Introduction
The relationship between economic growth and well-being recently raised a
lively debate. Easterlin (1974) pointed out that the US economic growth from
the Second World War on-ward did not bring about significant improvements
in Americans’ subjective well-being (SWB). This evidence – also known as
the Easterlin paradox – underwent an intensive scrutiny. The availability
of large data-sets covering several countries and long time-series, allowed to
test the existence of the paradox. Some scholars have confirmed it, clarifying
that in the short run economic growth and well-being are associated, whereas
in the long-run this positive relationship vanishes (Easterlin and Angelescu,
2009; Easterlin et al., 2010). Some others have contested the existence of the
paradox itself and claim that overall economic growth brings about better
lives (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2008; Inglehart et al., 2008; Sacks et al., 2010;
Veenhoven and Vergunst, 2013).
However, independently from whether economic growth matters for well-
being, other issues – such as social capital – seem to matter more. The
literature from micro-data documents that social capital (SC) is an important
ingredient of people’s well-being (Helliwell, 2002, 2008; Uhlaner, 1989). In
particular the quality of the relationships among people, has a predominant
impact on well-being (Helliwell and Putnam, 2004; Helliwell, 2006; Bruni and
Stanca, 2008; Becchetti et al., 2008).
SC and SWB are related over time as well. Recently, Bartolini et al.
(2013a) showed that the decline in a wide range of measures of SC predicts
the decline in US happiness over the past 30 years. This suggests that the
erosion of social capital (Putnam, 2000) may be an important component
of the explanation of the American version of the Easterlin paradox. This
result is further confirmed for Germany (Bartolini et al., 2013b). Finally,
Bartolini and Sarracino (2011) show that in a large sample of countries eco-
nomic growth is not correlated with the trends of well-being in the long run,
whereas such trends are strongly and significantly correlated with the trends
of social capital.
These results on one hand confirm the existence of the Easterlin paradox,
on the other they suggest to explore the possibility that durable improve-
ments in people’s quality of life require policies for social capital. How gen-
eral are these findings? To what extent they regard only developed countries?
These questions arise from the fact that such results are mainly based on ev-
idence from developed countries, whereas figures from developing countries
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are very scarce.
China plays a very important role to answer the former questions not only
because it counts a large share of the world population, but also because if
there is a country where economic growth should have played a significant
role for people’s well-being, than it is China. The data we use in this paper
begin in 1990, right after the Tiananmen Square Massacre, in a still extremely
poor country oppressed by a relentless dictatorship. Almost 20 years later
the Chinese society exhibits increasing segments of western-style opulence,
generally improved standards of life and greater political freedom compared
to the 80s.
In other words, China features all the ingredients for a big leap forward of
people’s well-being. Since 1990s Chinese GDP per capita has been growing
at a rate of about 10% each year, significantly improving the living conditions
of millions of people. For example, the World Bank is proud to announce
that the sustained Chinese growth dramatically decreased the number of
people living with less than 1.25 US$ per day. Some estimates suggest that,
since the early 80s, about 600 million people were lifted out of absolute
poverty. Between 1990 and 2010 the percentage of rural population with
access to improved water sources raised from 56% to 85%. Similarly, since
1990 the yearly growth of household final consumption expenditure increased
on average by 6.5%.1 Summarizing, there are many reasons to expect that
almost 20 years of Chinese economic growth should have been accompanied
by increasing well-being.
However, these objective records are in striking contrast with those from
subjective perceptions. China is an outstanding example of the Easterlin
paradox: figure 1 shows that between 1990 and 2007 average life satisfaction
substantially dropped (Easterlin et al., 2012).
Is it possible that objective data miss some worsening aspect of the Chi-
nese quality of life that is instead captured by subjective ones? Our findings
suggest that objective data miss to capture the increase in the importance
of social comparisons and the decline of social capital. These two powerful
drivers of the decline of well-being appear to be strictly connected to the
increasing orientation of Chinese people toward materialistic values. Our re-
sults suggest that Chinese values are probably following a path symbolized
by the motto “to get rich is glorious”, launched by Deng Xiaoping at the
beginning of the Chinese transition to capitalism. Perhaps not even Deng
1World Bank national accounts data and http://www.chinatoday.com/.
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Figure 1: Life satisfaction and income across time∗.
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∗Data about GDP per capita (2000 US$) are extracted from the World Development
Indicators, The World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-
indicators.
imagined that the kind of values he was promoting would have been so suc-
cessful in frustrating the well-being of Chinese people, despite a glorious
economic take-off.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 reviews the literature on the
relationship between economic growth and well-being in China. Section 3
illustrates the data available for present study and the relevant variables.
Section 4 discusses the relevant methodological aspects. Section 5 presents
the findings about the drop in people’s subjective well-being in China, both
across classes and between periods. Finally, section 6 briefly concludes and
set the lines for future research.
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2 Background
There are other two papers investigating the trend of well-being in China:
Brockmann et al. (2009) and Easterlin et al. (2012). Both papers stress the
importance of social comparisons as a cause for the disappointing trend of
life satisfaction. The main idea is that economic growth brought about a
dramatic improvement in economic conditions raising people’s expectations
about their perspective situation. However, Chinese growth went hand in
hand with rapidly increasing income inequality. The result is that many
Chinese people saw their absolute conditions improving, but not in relative
terms. Their economic position worsened when compared to that of large
segments of the population, thus resulting in decreasing well-being. More-
over, Easterlin et al. (2012) emphasize the role of the decay of safety nets as
a cause of the decline of well-being and stresses the similarity of the Chinese
trend of well-being with those from Eastern European countries that experi-
enced the transition from socialism to capitalism. What China and Eastern
Europe have in common is that under socialism workers were assured of jobs
and of an extensive safety net including health care, child care, pensions, and
the like. Privatization was typically accompanied by the dissolution of the
safety nets that negatively impacted people’s well-being.
Our results are compatible with the idea that the dissolution of the safety
nets played a relevant role in frustrating Chinese well-being, but they em-
phasize that such dissolution may have been a consequence of the decline in
social capital and not only of the transition to capitalism. Indeed, the Chi-
nese industrial revolution has a peculiar trait, being the first experiment of
transition from a socialist to a capitalist economy managed by a communist
party. However, despite its originality, the Chinese take-off shares many reg-
ularities with all industrial revolutions, beginning with the British one: rapid
urbanization, erosion of traditional institutions, pollution, reduced farmers’
access to land, increase of income inequality. The diminished water flow and
the pollution of the Yellow river basin – the core of Chinese agriculture –
result from the industrial expansion and they are the contemporary version
of the environmental devastations that accompanied the British Industrial
Revolution. The expropriation of agricultural land for industrial purposes,
that provokes every year thousands of riots suppressed with more or less
tough methods by the police, has the same effect of the enclosures.2 The re-
2Since early 90s, China faced a proliferation of ‘mass incidents’ (cases of civil unrest
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duction of the access to land pushes the lower rural classes to feed the ranks
of low-cost, urban labour force on which the industrial take-off is based.
Hence, the Chinese case is particularly relevant because it mirrors – alive
and on a Chinese scale – some stylized facts typical of all industrial revolu-
tions. These processes are associated with extensive erosion of social capital
and rapid changes in people’s values. For example, urbanization is a well-
known cause of erosion of social capital in rural areas. Moreover, in China
urban immigrants, between 100 and 200 millions depending on the estimates,
lose large part of their safety nets related to communitarian relationships.
These phenomena, well-known to development economists (Polanyi, 1968;
Williamson, 1995), clearly emerge from our figures on the decline of Chinese
social capital and the upsurge of materialism. In this context, the transition
to capitalism in China appears to have exacerbated the destruction of safety
nets associated to the decline of shared values and networks. This decline,
typical of every industrial revolution, affects people’s well-being in various
ways, well beyond the erosion of safety nets.
Using data from the World Values Survey, present work empirically ex-
plores the factors that predict the disappointing trend of well-being in China.
We adopt a longer time-span than previous studies to analyse what shaped
the long-term trend of well-being (1990 - 2007) and its short-term variations
(1990 - 2001 and 2001 - 2007). Moreover, present work tries to identify
who are the winners and the losers from economic growth investigating what
shaped the well-being of the lower, the middle and the upper class in China.
To these aims, this research adopts the Blinder-Oaxaca method to decom-
pose the variation of well-being over time and among classes in two compo-
nents: a part explained by a variation in the endowments of each variable and
a part explained by changes in people’s preferences. The same method has
been previously applied by Brockmann et al. (2009) to explain the well-being
gap in China between 1990 and 2000.
Results suggest that the erosion of social capital and social comparisons
are the two main factors explaining why economic growth did not turn into
higher people’s well-being. Furthermore, economic growth resulted in higher
well-being inequality among people: those in the lowest three deciles and the
middle-class experienced a marked reduction in well-being, whereas people in
oﬃcially recorded) that rose from under 9,000 in 1993 to 180,000 in 2010. A substantial
share of such incidents is due to protests against the expropriation of agricultural land
(Knight, 2013)
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the three highest deciles of the income distribution experienced a slight im-
provement in their conditions. Moreover, the almost flat relationship between
income and life satisfaction observed in 1990 turns into a steep relationship
at the end of our period of observation. Differences in the erosion of social
capital and in the evolution of materialistic values seem to be at the origin of
the increasing well-being differences among classes. Arguably, the huge in-
crease in income inequality largely contributed to the upsurge of well-being
inequality by raising social comparisons.
Our results on well-being inequality are at odds with those from Clark
et al. (2014) who, analyzing a large sample of countries, concludes that eco-
nomic growth tends to reduce well-being inequality. Despite its relevance,
the Chinese case does not suffice to conclude that economic growth is as-
sociated to an increase of well-being inequality. However, it suggests that
such increase is probable when the increase in income inequality has the size
recorded in China in the past two decades.
Interestingly, our figures about the decline of SWB in China resemble
those from the US documented by Bartolini et al. (2013a): the declining trend
of happiness in the US is almost entirely predicted by social comparisons
and by the decline in social capital. All in all, the scarce social quality of
economic growth seems to be the key to declining SWB in the major cover
growth stories of the past few decades in the developed and developing world.
3 Data
We adopt data from the WVS (2009), a data-set providing comparable infor-
mation about economic, social, cultural and political characteristics, survey-
ing nationally representative samples in each wave. This extensive data-set
provides national-level time-series on social capital, subjective well-being and
socio-demographic and economic controls concerning – among others – China
from the early 1990s to the year 2007.
The Chinese sample is made approximately of 1000 observations in each
wave. The sample was selected by quota after stratifying the population uni-
verse according to residence, gender, age, occupation and education (WVS,
2009).
Subjective well-being (SWB) is proxied by reported life satisfaction, a
variable ranging from 1 = “dissatisfied” to 10 = “satisfied” depending on
the answers to the following question: “all things considered, how satisfied
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are you with your life as a whole these days?”. This data-set provides also
another proxy of SWB, namely feelings of happiness. However, in present
article we will focus only on life satisfaction. The reasons are mainly two:
first, life satisfaction is reported on a ten points scale, whereas happiness is
on a four point scale. Hence, the former provides a better and more differen-
tiated information than the second one. Second, although the evidence from
the two variables is usually consistent, it is commonly held that happiness
provides a more emotional measure of well-being. On the contrary, life sat-
isfaction reflects a more cognitive evaluation of well-being and is therefore
regarded as more reliable (Diener, 2006).
The three main explanatory variables are household income, financial
dissatisfaction and social capital. Income is measured with an ordered scale
of income intervals. Financial dissatisfaction is observed after inverting the
scale of answers to the question: “how satisfied are you with the financial
situation of your household?”. After recoding, the answers range on a 10
points scale where higher numbers stand for greater dissatisfaction.
We document an increasing trend of financial dissatisfaction that may ap-
pear astonishing in a country that experienced such an economic boom. How-
ever, such trend appears more comprehensible in the light of previous studies
showing that financial dissatisfaction depends on aspirations that are shaped
by relative and not absolute standards (Brockmann et al., 2009; D’Ambrosio
and Frick, 2008). In other words individual dissatisfaction with own finan-
cial situation reflects social comparisons, i.e. individual achievements with
respect to what other people – with whom the respondent compares herself
– get.
The OECD (2001, p. 41), consistently with Putnam (2000) defines social
capital (SC) as “networks together with shared norms, values and under-
standings that facilitate co-operation within or among groups”. To observe
SC we use proxies that are generally accepted and applied by the literature
on the argument: generalized trust, a measure of civicness, and associational
activity (Paxton, 1999; Costa and Kahn, 2003).3
Trust in others is observed through answers to the following question:
“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that
you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?”. The resulting dichotomous
3The WVS allows to observe also another form of social capital, namely participation
in political actions. However, in the case of China the relevant variables are observed only
in one year thus preventing the analysis over time. For this reason, political action is
excluded from present analysis.
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variable is set to 1 if the respondent answers positively, 0 otherwise (Knack
and Keefer, 1997).
The index of civic cooperation is based on answers to questions if “claim-
ing government benefits which you are not entitled to”, “avoiding a fare on
public transport”, “cheating on taxes if you have the chance”, or “accepting
a bribe” are acceptable. Answers to these questions range on a 1 (never justi-
fiable) to 10 (always justifiable) scale. For the purposes of present work, each
of these variables has been recoded so that larger values stand for stronger
norms of civic cooperation. To construct the variable we first run a factor
analysis on the four questions and finally we generated an index of civic co-
operation as the average of the four initial variables (for more details, please
refer to the Appendix I on page 49). The index of civic cooperation mirrors
the scale of its four original variables: it ranges on a 10 points scale where
higher values stand for higher sense of civicness.
We proxy individual SC by observing the respondent’s participation in
various kinds of groups and associations. Indeed, the WVS includes a bat-
tery of questions concerning whether people belong or actively participate in
groups or associations. The list of organizations prompted during the inter-
view is quite long and contains – among others – religious, cultural, sport,
professional, environmental, human rights and political associations (for the
complete list of groups or associations see the Appendix J on page 51). We
measure associational activity with a dichotomous variable set to 1 if the
respondent participates or performs unpaid voluntary work for at least one
of the mentioned groups or associations, 0 otherwise.
To allow comparison with previous studies, we further included controls
for perceived freedom of choice and control over one’s own life. This variable
is observed on a scale from 1 (“none at all”) to 10 (“a great deal”) to indicate
how much freedom of choice the respondent feels to have over his/her own
life.
Finally, we included a standard set of socio-demographic controls such as
gender, age, marital and employment status, reported health and the region
where the interview was conducted. In the first wave in 1990 the surveyed
sample largely consisted of people from urban areas, while residents in ru-
ral areas were seldom reached. In the subsequent waves a representative
sampling of the urban and rural population was ensured. To account for
the potential bias this could cause, we have included a control for the re-
gion where the interview was taken. This control, together with the other
socio-economic variables, should allow to account for the potential differences
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
variable mean sd min max obs missing
satisfaction with life 6.876 2.343 1 10 3754 0
age 41.97 13.23 18 85 3767 0
age squared 1937 1152 324 7225 3767 0
female 0.490 0.500 0 1 3765 0
marital status – – 1 6 3749 0
employment status – – 1 8 3678 0.02
region – – 156001 156043 3765 0
state of health 3.805 1.001 1 5 3758 0
freedom of choice 7.205 2.321 1 10 3602 0.04
scale of incomes 4.293 2.142 1 10 3400 0.10
financial dissatisfaction 5.049 2.589 1 10 3725 0.01
trust in others 0.548 0.498 0 1 3715 0.01
index of civicness 9.127 1.385 1 10 3760 0
social participation 0.560 0.496 0 1 3763 0
among the first and the subsequent samples.
However, the possible bias towards an over-representation of urban pop-
ulation in the first wave does not undermine our main findings, but would
eventually strengthen them (see section 5). Table 1 summarizes the main
variables used in this study together with some descriptive statistics.
Percentages of missing data are on average below 10% thus they do not
raise concerns of seriously biasing the estimates (Schafer, 1997; Allison, 2001;
Little and Rubin, 2002).
4 Methodological aspects
Our aim is to predict the trend of SWB in China quantifying the relative
importance of the changes in social capital and income along with the other
predictors of life satisfaction. For this purpose we use the Blinder-Oaxaca
decomposition. This technique allows to decompose the well-being gap be-
tween the initial and the final year of observations identifying how much
the changes over time in the levels and in the coefficients of life satisfaction
regressors explain the well-being gap.
The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition has been developed in the early ’70s
by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) to study discrimination between men
and women in the labour market. Recently, it has been applied also in
other fields, including the literature on subjective well-being (Helliwell and
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Barrington-Leigh, 2010; Becchetti et al., 2010; Sarracino, 2012).
The decomposition method allows to study group differences in an out-
come variable by dividing its differential in two parts: the explained one,
accounting for differences in observed characteristics of the population and
the unexplained one, measuring the differences in the coefficients between
two groups. The latter is generally considered a discrimination measure
(Jann, 2008). For the purpose of the present article, the decomposition al-
lows to identify how much of the overall differential in the average subjective
well-being between two years can be ascribed to differences in the set of char-
acteristics as presented in eq. 1 (the explained part) and to differences in
how these characteristics are evaluated (the unexplained part).
We are aware that the ordered nature of the dependent variable would re-
quire ordered probit or logit techniques. However, we adopted a linear model
for ease of computation and comparison of the coefficients across years. More-
over, the recent literature on subjective well-being demonstrated that, when
the dependent variable has a sufficient number of categories, linear models
provide equivalent results of their ordered counterparts. In particular, Ferrer-
i Carbonell and Frijters (2004) conclude that assumptions on ordinality or
cardinality of the answers to a subjective well-being question are “relatively
unimportant to results”4.
A downside of the Blinder-Oaxaca approach is that the unexplained part
captures also the potential effects of differences in any unobserved variables
(Jann, 2008).
Formally, the decomposition can be represented as follows:
∆LS = [E(Xfy)− E(Xiy)]
′
· β∗
︸ ︷︷ ︸
explained
+ [E(Xfy)
′
· (βfy − β
∗) + E(Xiy)
′
· (β∗ − βiy)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
unexplained
(1)
where ∆LS is the difference in average subjective well-being between the final
(fy) and the initial (iy) year of observations, E(X) is the yearly average of a
vector of explanatory variables measured at the beginning and at the end of
the period of observation, βfy and βiy are vectors of coefficients and β
∗ is a
vector of non-discriminatory coefficients to quantify how much each group of
variables explains the overall difference of means. The vector of explanatory
variables includes the predictors of a standard happiness equation such as:
trust in others, index of civicness, participation in groups and association,
4Ferrer-i Carbonell and Frijters (2004)
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income, financial dissatisfaction, subjective health, freedom of choice and
control over one’s life, gender, age and age squared5, marital and employment
status along with a dummy for each region of residence.
5 Results
The results of the decomposition of the life satisfaction gap in China between
1990 and 2007 are presented in table 2 and detailed in tab. 4 on page 34 in
the Appendix. In 1990 the average level of life satisfaction amounted to 7.54
on a 10 points scale, whereas in 2007 it reduced to 6.83. Overall the Chinese
subjective well-being decreased by -7.1% between 1990 and 2007. Approx-
imately 65% of this variation is explained by changes in the endowments
between the two years. In other words, if the two years had the same levels
for each of the explanatory variables, the well-being differential would have
been 65% smaller. The remaining 35% of the life satisfaction gap remains
unexplained, that is to say it is related to changes in preferences between the
two periods.
Table 2: Decomposition of the life satisfaction gap between 1990 and 2007
in China.
satisfaction with life
Differential
Prediction 1 6.832∗∗∗ (104.84)
Prediction 2 7.546∗∗∗ (104.75)
Difference −0.714∗∗∗ (−7.35)
Decomposition
Explained −0.462∗∗∗ (−5.15)
Unexplained −0.252∗∗∗ (−3.94)
Observations 2085
z statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
5To account for the non-linearity between well-being and age, a squared term of the age
variable has been included in the equation. For ease of interpretation, the new variable
has been divided by 100.
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Figures 2a and 2b graphically summarize the contribution of the main
predictors of well-being to the life satisfaction gap.
Three main factors predict the well-being gap between 1990 and 2007:
the erosion of social capital, the increase of financial dissatisfaction and the
changes in preferences; as for the latter, in 2007 Chinese well-being was
more strongly associated to social comparisons and less strongly associated
to social capital and to freedom of choice compared to 1990. The negative
impact of this changes in preferences is only partially moderated by the higher
importance of health and of income. For what concerns the explained part
of the gap, the negative impact of the changes in social capital and financial
dissatisfaction is only attenuated by a weak increase in freedom of choice and
control over one’s life.
Besides these variables, part of the well-being gap is also explained by
changes in socio-demographic predictors such as marital status, employment
status and the ageing of the population. Between 1990 and 2007 the number
of married people decreased, whereas those divorced or widowed increased.
At the same time, also the importance that people attach to these dimen-
sions reduced dramatically. Similarly, the number of part-time employees,
housewives, students and unemployed people increased significantly, while
self-employed people reduced.
Table 3 in Appendix A informs that all three proxies of social capital
sharply declined. Trust in others decreased by 7%, the index of civic be-
haviour reduced by 7.4%, while associational activity dropped by 3.4%. Over-
all, the decline of social capital explains 21% of the explained gap and 13.5%
of the overall life satisfaction gap. Given this erosion, if we assume that
people’s preferences for social capital did not change since 1990, the overall
effect on life satisfaction would be -1.8% rather than the predicted decrease
of -7.1%. In other words the decline of life satisfaction due to the erosion of
social capital would be -5.3% smaller than the actual one.6 To better grasp
how much the change in preferences for social capital affects life satisfaction,
let’s assume that the endowments of social capital did not change since 1990.
This amounts to compute the life satisfaction gap if only preferences had
changed. Computations are presented in tab. 7 in Appendix B. The change
in preferences that happened between 1990 and 2007 predicts a -6.6% de-
crease in life satisfaction, only 0.5% less than the actual decrease. In other
words, the loss of social capital endowments affects the life satisfaction gap
6See tab. 8 in Appendix B for more details.
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Figure 2: Detailed decomposition of the explained and unexplained part of
the life satisfaction gap between 1990 and 2007 in China.
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less than the changes in preferences.
A further 15.5% of the gap is explained by a slight increase (+2.5%) in
financial dissatisfaction (see fig. 2a). At the same time, the importance of so-
cial comparisons for the well-being of the average Chinese doubled compared
to 1990, thus further affecting people’s well-being (see fig. 2b).
Summarizing, there are two main sets of forces shaping the life satisfaction
gap between 1990 and 2007 in China:
• the variation of endowments of the correlates of life satisfaction: among
these the increase of financial dissatisfaction and the erosion of social
capital are the main sources of the decrease in well-being. Remarkably,
the two groups of variables exert a fairly comparable effect on well-
being;
• the change of preferences: in 2007 people attach more importance than
previously to social comparisons and income, and lower importance
to other dimensions such as social capital and freedom of choice and
control.
The massive shifts in preferences that we document, arguably, mirror the
shifts in life priorities connected to the spread of what social psychologists
define as materialistic values (see Kasser, 2002, for a review). Materialism is
a personal values system attributing a high priority in life goals to extrinsic
motivations and low priority to intrinsic motivations. The distinction be-
tween the two refers, respectively, to the instrumentality or lack thereof of
the motivations for doing something. The term extrinsic stands for moti-
vations that are external to an activity, such as success, money, status and
image. Conversely, “one is said to be intrinsically motivated to perform an
activity when one receives no apparent reward except the activity itself”
(Deci, 1971, p. 105). While components of social capital as associational ac-
tivities, civic-minded behavior and trust are intrinsically motivated, a strong
emphasis on social comparisons is a typical materialistic feature. The in-
creasing dependence of Chinese well-being on extrinsically motivated factors
and the lesser dependence on intrinsically motivated ones seem to reflect the
spread of materialistic values.
The possible bias towards an over-representation of urban population in
the first wave (see section 3) does not undermine our main findings, but would
eventually strengthen them. Indeed, such bias would eventually lead to an
under-estimation of the decline of social capital and, in particular, of trust
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in others which is normally higher in rural areas. Moreover, the rural-urban
divide in developing countries is generally associated to an income inequality
divide which is greater in urban areas (Eastwood and Lipton, 2000). China
makes no exception to this regularity that makes cities an engine of social
comparisons. Therefore, the above mentioned sample bias would lead to
conclude that the sharp increase in the importance of social comparisons
that we document is underestimated. Finally, the sample bias would make
the relationship between income and well-being steeper because in urban
areas income differences matter more for well-being, for instance, because of
the lower availability of free or low-cost amenities. Hence, the strengthening
over time of the relationship between income and life satisfaction (see fig. 4)
does not depend on the sample bias because it would point to an even flatter
relationship than the almost flat one that we find in 1990.
5.1 Explaining the evolution of well-being inequalities
across income classes
In a recent work Clark et al. (2012) wonder whether economic growth reduces
well-being inequalities. Analysing a broad set of countries, he finds a positive
answer. However, this does not seem to hold for China (Easterlin et al., 2012)
and present data confirm this conclusion: in the considered period the well-
being inequality among income quintiles increased (see fig. 3).
In 1990 the average level of life satisfaction of people from the five quintiles
of the Chinese income distribution was relatively concentrated between 7 and
8 points on the 10-points life satisfaction scale. The period up to 2001 saw a
generalized decrease in the average well-being and a much higher dispersion
across quintiles. In about 10 years the poorest income quintile lost about
1.5 points in well-being, whereas the richest quintile lost about 0.5 points.
During the following 6 years the well-being conditions stopped worsening and
possibly reverted. Overall, the average life satisfaction by income quintile in
2007 is much more dispersed than previously, thus confirming the observation
that, in the case of China, economic growth increased well-being inequalities.
In other words, the relationship between income and well-being switches
from being basically flat – a condition of substantial equality – in 1990 to
steep in 2007 (see fig. 4).
What is behind this transformation? What does explain the different
outcome in terms of well-being of Chinese people? The following subsections
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Figure 3: Trends of life satisfaction by income quintiles of the Chinese pop-
ulation.
describe the predictors of the well-being gap for the lower, the middle and
the upper class between 1990 - 2001 and 2001 - 2007. People in the three
lowest deciles of the income distribution belong to the lower class; people
in the three highest deciles belong to the upper class and those in between
belong to the middle class.
5.1.1 The period 1990 – 2001
The first phase of the Chinese economic growth can be defined as anti-poor
from the point of view of well-being. Figure 5) documents that the first ten
years of the Chinese development have left unchanged the well-being of the
richest classes, while substantially penalizing the lower ones.
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Figure 4: Relationship between life satisfaction and income decile in 1990
and 2007.
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Figure 5: Anti-poor economic growth: life satisfaction and income deciles in
1990 and 2001.
Between 1990 and 2001 the life satisfaction of people in the poorer class
dropped by -1.64 points, that is to say a variation of -16.4%. Besides the
socio-demographic changes, 81% of the life satisfaction gap is explained by
changes in endowments, whereas the changes in preferences account for the
remaining 19% (see tab. C in Appendix C on page 37). The contribution
of each of the relevant variables to the composition of the gap is graphically
summarized in fig. 6.
Between 1990 and 2001 Chinese people belonging to the lowest three
deciles of the income distribution became largely dissatisfied with their fi-
nancial situation, shared lower levels of social capital, perceived less freedom
of choice and control over their lives and had worst perceptions about their
health (see fig. 6a). Among these, the effect of financial dissatisfaction was
pivotal. The negative impact for well-being of these changes is further re-
inforced by the changes in preferences (see fig. 6b). In 2001 well-being was
considerably more related to financial dissatisfaction and less connected to
social capital. The negative effect of these two forces was only marginally
offset by the increase in income and in its importance.
In the same period also the middle class experienced a substantial well-
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Figure 6: Explained and unexplained part of the well-being gap for the lower
class between 1990 and 2001 in China.
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being loss of approximately -13%. Also in this case the largest part of the
gap (about 91%) was due to changes in endowments and, in particular, in
financial dissatisfaction and, to a much smaller extent, in freedom of choice
and control over one’s life and social capital. Also for what concerns the
middle class the period between 1990 and 2001 was characterized by deep
changes in preferences. In particular, the highest importance that people
attach to social capital predicts the largest share of the positive effect for
well-being together with the higher importance attached to income. All
other variables, social comparisons, health and freedom of choice, predict a
decrease in life satisfaction (see fig. 7).
Rich people are those who lost less in terms of well-being from the first
10 years of economic growth. In this period, the average well-being of people
in the three upper deciles of the income distribution decreased by 7%, less
than the half of the loss of the lower class. The decomposition of the life
satisfaction gap identifies the changes of preferences as the main cause of the
change in well-being (see tab. E in Appendix E on page 41). In particular,
the changes of preferences concerning social capital, together with the ones
for income, predicted an increase in well-being. Their positive effect is more
than counterbalanced by the increase of the importance of social comparisons,
health and freedom of choice and control (see fig. 8).
Summarizing, the change in the position and inclination of the relation-
ship between life satisfaction and income between 1990 and 2001 (see fig.
5) is largely related to changes in the endowments of the middle and the
lower classes. In both cases, the increased financial dissatisfaction explains
a large share of the overall variation. However, the lower classes experienced
a greater loss of life satisfaction mainly because they are the only class ex-
periencing also a decline in their social capital. Moreover, the increase in
the importance of social comparisons and income for life satisfaction across
all income classes suggests a generalized spread of materialistic values. Such
spread seems relatively stronger among the lower classes, thus further con-
tributing to the relatively greater diminution of their well-being. Indeed,
the lower classes experienced a decrease in the importance attached to social
capital, whereas such importance increased for the middle and the upper
class. On the contrary, the moderate decrease in the life satisfaction of the
upper class was entirely explained by changes in the preferences. In partic-
ular, the higher importance attached to social comparisons coupled with the
lower importance attached to health and freedom of choice and control offset
the positive effect for well-being predicted by the higher importance of social
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Figure 7: Explained and unexplained part of the well-being gap for the middle
class between 1990 and 2001 in China.
22
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
fre
ed
om
_c
ho
ice
he
alt
h
so
c_
ca
p
so
c_
co
m
pa
ris
on
s
inc
om
e
 
 parameter estimate  90% conf. interval
(a) Explained part of the gap
−
1
0
1
2
fre
ed
om
_c
ho
ice
he
alt
h
so
c_
ca
p
so
c_
co
m
pa
ris
on
s
inc
om
e
 
 parameter estimate  90% conf. interval
(b) Unexplained part of the gap
Figure 8: Explained and unexplained part of the well-being gap of rich people
between 1990 and 2001 in China.
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capital and of income.
24
5.1.2 The period 2001 – 2007
What does happen in the subsequent period? Between 2001 and 2007 eco-
nomic growth was characterized by a further shift upwards of the relationship
between life satisfaction and income. However, while the first phase was char-
acterized by worsening conditions for the poorer classes, the second phase saw
a gradual improvement of the conditions of the upper classes (see fig. 9).
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Figure 9: Pro-rich economic growth: life satisfaction and income deciles in
2001 and 2007.
Indeed, in this period the average life satisfaction of people in the lower
class changed very modestly (about 2.3%) and its explained and unexplained
components are not significantly different from zero (see tab. F in the Ap-
pendix F on page 43). Figure 10a informs that between 2001 and 2007 the
variation of the endowments of social capital did not predict a significant
change in life satisfaction, whereas the main contributors to the increasing
life satisfaction are the decreased financial dissatisfaction and the improve-
ment in perceived health.
The other two classes were those who gained the most from the second
period of economic growth: after the initial decline of well-being, the mid-
dle and the upper class experienced an increase in well-being of about 9.5%.
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Figure 10: Explained and unexplained part of the well-being gap of the lower
class between 2001 and 2007 in China.
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Remarkably, the variation of the previous period was about -13% thus sug-
gesting that the net effect for people’s well-being in the middle class was
negative (about -7%) and that the real winner from the 17 years of uninter-
rupted economic growth was the upper class.
For what concerns the middle class, 2/3 of the increase in well-being are
explained by lower financial dissatisfaction, higher health and freedom of
choice and control over one’s life and is moderated by the negative effect of
the decreasing availability of social capital (see fig. 11a). The remaining 1/3
of the increase in well-being is attributed to changing preferences: a higher
importance of income, of freedom of choice and control and, to a smaller
extent, of health, and a lower importance of social comparisons. Also in this
case the positive impact for well-being is moderated by the lower importance
that Chinese people attach to social capital. Arguably, if the endowments
and the importance for people of social capital had not changed over time,
than the actual well-being gain for the middle class would have been higher
(see tab. G in Appendix G on page 45 and fig. 11).
The Chinese at the top of the income distribution were those who gained
the most both between 2001 and 2007 and in the overall period. In the
second phase of the economic growth, the average happiness of richest people
increased by 9.5%, basically as much as the middle class. However, differently
from the middle class, they had lost much less in terms of well-being during
the period 1990 - 2007. Hence, the net effect at the end of the 17 years
considered was an increase in well-being by about 4%. Put it differently,
people belonging to the Chinese upper class were the true winners from the
Chinese economic miracle. Figures from the decomposition in tab. 20 on
page 48 point out that this effect was entirely explained by changes in the
endowments, whereas the changes in preferences predict a very negligible
variation of well-being. Between 2001 and 2007 Chinese people in the upper
class reported lower levels of dissatisfaction with their financial situation,
had more freedom of choice and control over their lives and shared less social
capital (see tab. H in Appendix H on page 47 and fig. 12a). Similarly to
what happened to other Chinese people, if social capital had not been eroded,
people’s subjective well-being would have been higher.
The analysis of the well-being change of the period 2001 - 2007 confirms
that the upper class benefited the most from Chinese economic growth. The
middle and upper classes became more satisfied with their financial situation,
attached less importance to and shared less social capital and were giving
more emphasis to social comparisons. As for the lower class, the good news
27
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
fre
ed
om
_c
ho
ice
he
alt
h
so
c_
ca
p
so
c_
co
m
pa
ris
on
s
inc
om
e
 
 parameter estimate  90% conf. interval
(a) Explained part of the gap
−
2
−
1
0
1
fre
ed
om
_c
ho
ice
he
alt
h
so
c_
ca
p
so
c_
co
m
pa
ris
on
s
inc
om
e
 
 parameter estimate  90% conf. interval
(b) Unexplained part of the gap
Figure 11: Explained and unexplained part of the well-being gap of the
middle class between 2001 and 2007 in China.
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Figure 12: Explained and unexplained part of the well-being gap of the rich
people between 2001 and 2007 in China.
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is limited to the halt of the worsening of its well-being. For what concerns
the evolution of social comparisons, the coefficients associated with financial
dissatisfaction have a similar U shape across all social classes. Considering
the whole sample, between 1990 and 2001 social comparisons assumed a
pivotal role for Chinese well-being (from -0.19 in 1990 to -0.58 in 2001). In
the subsequent period the importance of social comparisons attenuated (from
-0.58 in 2001 to -0.34 in 2007). Nonetheless, the net effect of these changes
was still very negative since the coefficient almost doubled between 1990 and
2007.
Summarizing, the spread of materialism recorded in the period 1990 and
2001, especially among the lower classes, attenuated and eventually reverted
in the subsequent period. This change was particularly pronounced among
lower classes between 2001 and 2007. Indeed, differently from the upper and
the middle class, the lower class exhibits an increase in the importance of
social capital, beyond the decrease in the relevance of financial dissatisfac-
tion. However, this change missed to improve the life satisfaction of the lower
income classes. In the period 2001-2007, the relative gains of life satisfaction
were mainly affected by the gains in financial satisfaction, which are dispro-
portionately favorable to the upper and the middle class compared to the
lower income classes.
6 Conclusion
The recent debate suggests that the trend of social capital plays a much
greater role than economic growth in shaping the evolution over time of peo-
ple’s subjective well-being. In the long run it is much more likely that well-
being grows in countries where social capital grows than where the economy
grows. These findings – plenty of policy implications – are mainly drawn
from evidence concerning developed countries. This raises the question of
the generality of these conclusions. To what extent can they be applied to
developing countries?
China has a very important role to answer this question. One obvious
reason is the gigantic scale of the Chinese take-off. Another reason is that
if there is a country where economic growth should have played a significant
role for people’s well-being, than it is China. This country scores outstanding
improvements in all indicators of standards of life. However, these objective
records are in striking contrast with those from subjective perceptions. In
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2007 the average Chinese felt substantially less satisfied with his/her life than
in 1990. What predicts this change? To answer this question present work
uses the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition of the time-series of life satisfaction
using the World Values Survey data collected in China in the period 1990 –
2007.
Our findings suggest that subjective data capture something that is missed
by objective data: the increase in the importance of social comparisons and
the decline of social capital. These two powerful drivers of the decline of
well-being appear to be strictly connected to the increasing orientation of
Chinese people toward materialistic values. The decreasing role of sociabil-
ity and the increasing role of income comparisons in the life experience and
values of Chinese people are at the core of the decline in their well-being.
A simulation suggests that, if preferences for social capital had stayed
constant at their values of 1990, the well-being in 2007 would have been
- 1.8% rather than the observed -7.1%, i.e. the life satisfaction gap would
have been 5.3% smaller. Hence, the Chinese economic growth has been
going hand in hand not only with the erosion of social capital, but also
with the erosion of its importance for well-being. However, our results also
confirm the evidence from previous studies documenting the strong role of
social comparisons in frustrating Chinese well-being. However, important
differences emerged among Chinese social classes and among periods.
Economic growth not only had a disappointing impact on average well-
being, but it also increased well-being inequalities among people. China
moved from a situation of substantial equality of well-being among income
deciles in 1990 to an unequal one: in 2007 income was positively related to
life satisfaction.
In the period 1990 - 2001 the lower and middle classes experienced a
substantial worsening of their life satisfaction due mainly to lower financial
satisfaction, lower social capital and more materialistic concerns. In the
same period also the upper class experienced a reduction of life satisfaction,
but much less than the other two classes – the well-being gap for the upper
class was about half the gap of the lower – and mainly because of social
comparisons that became pivotal for people’s well-being.
Between 2001 and 2007 the well-being of the lower classes improved
marginally, whereas the middle and the upper class experienced a signifi-
cant improvement: for the middle class the net effect of the two periods
remained negative, but for the richest one economic growth delivered the
expected results. The increase in the financial satisfaction of the upper class
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shows that they felt the winners of social comparisons, whose importance for
well-being doubled. This more than off-set the negative impact of the decline
of their social capital, whose importance shrank.
Overall, between 1990 and 2007 the well-being of the lower class reduced
by about 14%. The gap is mainly explained by the fact that these people
became poorer in social capital, reported health and financial satisfaction.
At the same time they experienced a stronger materialistic orientation.
Summarizing, between 1990 and 2007 the good news for Chinese life
satisfaction are limited to a 2.5% increase for the upper class. The breaking
news are negative: a 4% and 14% decrease for the middle and the lower class,
respectively. The picture of a little gain in well-being for the few winners of
the Chinese economic miracle paid at the price of substantial losses of life
satisfaction for the great majority of people mirrors the picture of a country
that grew rapidly more uneven and in which increasing social poverty was
the dark side of rising economic wealth. The decline in social capital indeed
lies at the core of these disappointing trends, including the limited increase
in the life satisfaction of rich people.
China seems to replicate patterns experienced by western countries, de-
spite the enormous historical, economic, cultural, and institutional differ-
ences. The declines of Chinese life satisfaction and American happiness in
the past few decades share a crucial role for the decline of social capital and
social comparisons (Bartolini et al., 2013a). All in all, the decline in social
capital seems to be central to the major episodes of the Easterlin paradox in
the developed and developing world.
32
A Life satisfaction decomposition between 1990
and 2007
Table 3: Coefficients and X-values for 1990 and 2007 in China.
b2007 b1990 bref X2007 X1990
age −0.087 −0.011 −0.053 44.340 43.921
age squared 0.001 0.000 0.001 2139.795 2073.807
female −0.062 0.028 0.042 0.519 0.398
how many children do you have 0.099 −0.002 0.063 1.873 2.224
married 0.680 1.652 0.460 0.840 0.957
living together 0.112 3.158 0.439 0.010 0.003
divorced 0.052 0.836 −0.205 0.015 0.008
separated −0.738 0.826 −0.485 0.004 0.003
widowed 0.457 2.164 0.456 0.039 0.029
part time −0.011 0.080 −0.116 0.085 0.020
self-employed 0.158 0.160 0.216 0.042 0.236
retired −0.297 0.201 −0.110 0.051 0.061
housewife 0.081 0.320 −0.080 0.075 0.010
student −0.777 0.635 −0.082 0.019 0.003
unemployed −0.331 0.028 0.158 0.034 0.003
other −0.594 −0.124 −0.642 0.079 0.003
scale of incomes 0.070 0.010 0.027 3.983 3.179
financial dissatisfaction −0.370 −0.207 −0.465 4.967 4.717
state of health 0.386 0.356 0.308 3.806 3.798
freedom of choice 0.197 0.294 0.169 7.344 7.197
trust in others 0.064 0.147 0.143 0.543 0.617
index of civicness 0.045 0.118 0.064 8.806 9.549
social participation 0.098 −0.024 0.116 0.374 0.711
Constant 6.160 2.431 7.247 1.000 1.000
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Table 4: Detailed decomposition of the life satisfaction gap betwen 1990 and 2007 in China.
satisfaction with life
Differential Explained Unexplained
Prediction 1 6.832∗∗∗
(7.50e + 15)
Prediction 2 7.546∗∗∗
(3.85e + 16)
Difference −0.714∗∗∗
(−7.35e + 14)
age 0.0190∗∗ −1.592∗∗∗
(2.39) (−200.47)
female 0.00508 −0.0484∗∗∗
(0.97) (−9.19)
how many children do you have −0.0222∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗
(−3.51) (33.57)
mar stat −0.0479∗∗ −1.024∗∗∗
(−1.97) (−42.15)
empl stat −0.0994∗∗∗ −0.0337
(−3.40) (−1.15)
scale of incomes 0.0215 0.227∗∗∗
(0.92) (9.71)
soc comparisons −0.116∗∗∗ −0.745∗∗∗
(−6.15) (−39.50)
health 0.00254∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗
(6.65) (297.90)
freedom choice 0.0248∗∗∗ −0.690∗∗∗
(4.80) (−133.37)
soc cap −0.0973∗∗∗ −0.632∗∗∗
(−5.70) (−37.02)
Total −0.462∗∗∗ −0.252∗∗
(−3.67) (−2.00)
Constant 3.729∗∗∗
(2.93e + 12)
Observations 2085
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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B Three scenarions for the unexplained life
satisfaction gap
Table 5: Coefficients and X-values for the proxies of social capital.
variable β2007 β1990 βref X2007 X1990
trust in others 0.064 0.147 0.143 0.543 0.617
index of civic cooperation 0.045 0.118 0.064 8.806 9.549
social participation 0.098 −0.024 0.116 0.374 0.711
Table 5 provides figures about the coefficients and the endowments for
1990 and 2007 for the three proxies of social capital. These figures are used
to compute the life satisfaction variation predicted by the proxies of social
capital.
According to the unexplained side of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition,
the variation of life satisfaction due to differences in the coefficients of social
capital proxies is given by:
LSSCgap = [E(X2007)
′
· (b2007 − bref) + E(X1990)
′
· (bref − b1990)] (2)
amounting to -0.63 (see tab. 6).
Table 6: Life satisfaction variation due to differences in the coefficients of
social capital.
variable ∆life satisfaction
trust in others −0.04
index of civic cooperation −0.68
social participation 0.09
total −0.63
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How much does life satisfaction change when holding the endowment of
social capital constant to its 1990 level? Formally, the unexplained part of
the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition turns to be:
LSSCgap = [E(X1990)
′
· (b2007 − bref) + E(X1990)
′
· (bref − b1990)] (3)
amounting to -0.66 (see tab. 7).
Table 7: Life satisfaction variation due to differences in social capital coeffi-
cients holding constant the levels of 1990.
variable ∆life satisfaction
trust in others −0.05
index of civic cooperation −0.69
social participation 0.08
total −0.66
How much does life satisfaction change when holding the coefficients of
social capital constant to their 1990 values? Formally, the unexplained part
of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition turns to be:
LSSCgap = [E(X2007)
′
· (b1990 − bref) + E(X1990)
′
· (bref − b1990)] (4)
amounting to -0.09 (see tab. 8).
Table 8: Life satisfaction variation due to differences in the coefficients of
social capital holding the 1990 values.
variable ∆life satisfaction
trust in others −0.01
index of civic cooperation −0.08
social participation 0.008
total −0.09
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C Life satisfaction decomposition for the lower
class between 1990 and 2001
Table 9: Coefficients and X-values for 1990 and 2001 in China for the three
lowest deciles of the income distribution.
β2001 β1990 βref X2001 X1990
age −0.091 −0.048 −0.053 40.880 42.952
age squared 0.001 0.000 0.001 1809.769 1986.095
female −0.309 −0.073 −0.167 0.513 0.392
how many children do you have −0.129 0.004 −0.006 1.778 2.266
married 2.139 1.976 1.923 0.838 0.950
living together 3.389 3.426 3.009 0.009 0.004
divorced −0.671 1.139 0.825 0.009 0.010
separated 0.000 0.377 0.333 0.000 0.002
widowed 1.317 2.556 2.197 0.034 0.033
part time 1.110 0.295 0.850 0.111 0.014
self-employed −1.932 0.387 0.466 0.009 0.247
retired −0.508 0.231 0.257 0.017 0.046
housewife 1.396 0.006 −0.532 0.085 0.012
student 0.000 0.751 0.979 0.000 0.004
unemployed 2.037 1.918 1.507 0.051 0.002
other −1.333 0.013 0.242 0.009 0.002
scale of incomes 0.686 0.165 0.123 2.427 2.288
financial dissatisfaction −0.507 −0.196 −0.287 6.103 4.853
state of health 0.230 0.333 0.328 3.479 3.784
freedom of choice 0.328 0.276 0.252 6.974 7.158
trust in others 0.212 0.231 0.243 0.453 0.614
index of civicness −0.415 0.157 0.130 9.415 9.587
social participation 0.865 −0.039 0.113 0.718 0.712
Constant 7.214 2.385 5.110 1.000 1.000
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Table 10: Detailed decomposition of the life satisfaction gap betwen 1990 and 2001 in China for the three
lowest deciles of the income distribution.
satisfaction with life
Differential Explained Unexplained
Prediction 1 5.872∗∗∗
(1.10e + 18)
Prediction 2 7.512∗∗∗
(9.16e + 16)
Difference −1.640∗∗∗
(−2.14e + 16)
age 0.00647∗∗∗ −0.146∗∗∗
(1.45e + 14) (−6.80e + 16)
female −0.0202∗∗∗ −0.109∗∗∗
(−4.87e + 15) (−5.68e + 16)
how many children do you have 0.00289∗∗∗ −0.242∗∗∗
(3.16e + 15) (−2.20e + 16)
mar stat −0.200∗∗∗ 0.0741∗∗∗
(−1.43e + 15) (1.08e + 16)
empl stat −0.00278∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗
(−2.27e + 14) (5.46e + 15)
scale of incomes 0.0172∗∗∗ 1.271∗∗∗
(1.66e + 15) (4.87e + 16)
soc comparisons −0.358∗∗∗ −1.786∗∗∗
(−1.90e + 16) (−2.55e + 17)
health −0.100∗∗∗ −0.360∗∗∗
(−3.70e + 16) (−2.87e + 18)
freedom choice −0.0463∗∗∗ 0.356∗∗∗
(−1.36e + 15) (4.18e + 16)
soc cap −0.0609∗∗∗ −4.750∗∗∗
(−3.43e + 16) (−1.32e + 17)
Total −1.323∗∗∗ −0.317∗∗∗
(−3.03e + 16) (−2.63e + 15)
Constant 4.829
(.)
Observations 635
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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D Life satisfaction decomposition for the mid-
dle class between 1990 and 2001
Table 11: Coefficients and X-values for 1990 and 2001 in China for the four
intermediate deciles of the income distribution.
β2001 β1990 βref X2001 X1990
age −0.074 0.102 −0.016 39.612 47.022
age squared 0.001 −0.001 0.000 1678.606 2350.067
female −0.288 0.386 −0.127 0.494 0.406
how many children do you have 0.022 0.025 0.057 1.791 2.222
married 0.702 −0.186 0.516 0.924 0.972
living together 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
divorced −0.822 0.000 −1.034 0.012 0.000
separated 0.000 −0.528 −0.014 0.000 0.006
widowed 0.379 0.000 0.095 0.018 0.022
part time −0.516 −0.738 −0.470 0.082 0.039
self-employed 0.166 −0.296 −0.183 0.009 0.211
retired 0.500 −0.450 −0.149 0.009 0.106
housewife 0.593 2.419 0.312 0.068 0.006
student −4.472 0.000 −4.002 0.003 0.000
unemployed 1.352 −1.569 0.993 0.038 0.006
other 0.476 −0.094 0.299 0.012 0.006
scale of incomes 0.065 −0.240 −0.073 5.221 4.756
financial dissatisfaction −0.532 −0.179 −0.465 5.750 4.200
state of health 0.237 0.509 0.361 3.853 3.844
freedom of choice 0.125 0.313 0.164 7.124 7.278
trust in others 0.328 0.295 0.339 0.559 0.622
index of civicness 0.227 −0.095 0.143 9.473 9.479
social participation 0.042 −0.149 0.061 0.821 0.700
Constant 5.218 3.874 4.326 1.000 1.000
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Table 12: Detailed decomposition of the life satisfaction gap betwen 1990 and 2001 in China for the four
intermediate deciles of the income distribution.
satisfaction with life
Differential Explained Unexplained
Prediction 1 6.324∗∗∗
(5.90e + 15)
Prediction 2 7.622∗∗∗
(2.90e + 15)
Difference −1.299∗∗∗
(−4.59e + 14)
age −0.0730 −4.215∗∗∗
(−1.42) (−81.87)
female −0.0113 −0.288∗∗∗
(−0.48) (−12.25)
how many children do you have −0.0244∗∗ 0.00835
(−2.00) (0.68)
mar stat −0.0376∗∗ 0.866∗∗∗
(−2.32) (53.34)
empl stat 0.0729∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗
(3.10) (4.64)
scale of incomes −0.0340 1.514∗∗∗
(−0.47) (20.80)
soc comparisons −0.722∗∗∗ −1.587∗∗∗
(−4.24) (−9.33)
health 0.00307∗∗ −1.045∗∗∗
(2.51) (−855.68)
freedom choice −0.0253∗∗ −1.363∗∗∗
(−2.76) (−148.76)
soc cap −0.0150∗∗∗ 3.206∗∗∗
(−4.66) (992.44)
Total −1.182∗∗∗ −0.117∗∗∗
(−91.44) (−9.05)
Constant 1.344∗∗∗
(2.11e + 12)
Observations 520
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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E Life satisfaction decomposition for the up-
per class between 1990 and 2001
Table 13: Coefficients and X-values for 1990 and 2001 in China for the three
highest deciles of the income distribution.
β2001 β1990 βref X2001 X1990
age −0.092 0.164 −0.123 40.287 42.447
age squared 0.001 −0.003 0.001 1751.591 1960.868
female 0.252 −0.747 0.153 0.493 0.447
how many children do you have −0.008 0.401 0.019 1.710 1.658
married 0.572 0.000 0.884 0.880 0.974
living together 2.153 0.000 2.318 0.003 0.000
divorced 0.000 −5.104 1.053 0.000 0.026
separated −1.687 0.000 −1.762 0.003 0.000
widowed −0.037 0.000 0.226 0.022 0.000
part time 0.341 −0.975 0.256 0.092 0.026
self-employed 0.705 1.657 0.555 0.092 0.211
retired −0.386 3.386 −0.343 0.078 0.053
housewife 0.077 0.000 −0.037 0.056 0.000
student −0.260 0.000 −0.228 0.008 0.000
unemployed 0.547 0.000 0.385 0.045 0.000
other −0.734 0.000 −0.863 0.008 0.000
scale of incomes −0.066 −0.122 −0.072 7.838 7.868
financial dissatisfaction −0.552 −0.307 −0.530 4.855 5.316
state of health −0.050 −0.196 −0.084 3.816 3.763
freedom of choice 0.239 0.417 0.236 7.315 7.342
trust in others 0.266 −1.089 0.198 0.571 0.632
index of civicness 0.094 −0.025 0.050 9.431 9.362
social participation 0.166 −0.016 0.115 0.866 0.737
Constant 9.088 11.292 10.137 1.000 1.000
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Table 14: Detailed decomposition of the life satisfaction gap betwen 1990 and 2001 in China for the three
highest deciles of the income distribution.
satisfaction with life
Differential Explained Unexplained
Prediction 1 6.950∗∗∗
(1.51e + 16)
Prediction 2 7.658∗∗∗
(1.42e + 16)
Difference −0.708∗∗∗
(−1.63e + 15)
age −0.0133 −3.191∗∗∗
(−1.03) (−246.63)
female 0.00699 0.451∗∗∗
(1.02) (66.18)
how many children do you have 0.000981 −0.680∗∗∗
(1.22) (−847.16)
mar stat −0.104∗∗ 0.742∗∗∗
(−2.45) (17.51)
empl stat −0.0518∗∗∗ −0.363∗∗∗
(−10.91) (−76.52)
scale of incomes 0.00217∗∗∗ 0.439∗∗∗
(12.00) (2425.81)
soc comparisons 0.244∗∗∗ −1.294∗∗∗
(14.28) (−75.77)
health −0.00445 0.550∗∗∗
(−1.42) (174.85)
freedom choice −0.00645∗∗∗ −1.312∗∗∗
(−32.63) (−6637.64)
soc cap 0.00634∗∗∗ 2.106∗∗∗
(3.81) (1263.88)
Total −0.118 −0.590∗∗∗
(−0.66) (−3.30)
Constant −2.203∗∗∗
(−2.58e + 12)
Observations 397
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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F Life satisfaction decomposition for the lower
class between 2001 and 2007
Table 15: Coefficients and X-values for 2001 and 2007 in China for the three
lowest deciles of the income distribution.
β2007 β2001 βref X2007 X2001
age −0.028 −0.091 −0.038 46.295 40.880
age squared 0.000 0.001 0.001 2301.874 1809.769
female −0.203 −0.309 −0.105 0.498 0.513
how many children do you have 0.115 −0.129 0.111 2.105 1.778
married 0.117 2.139 0.348 0.860 0.838
living together 0.445 3.389 0.761 0.012 0.009
divorced 0.180 −0.671 −0.033 0.010 0.009
separated −0.805 0.000 −0.498 0.005 0.000
widowed −0.087 1.317 0.115 0.053 0.034
part time 0.149 1.110 0.133 0.078 0.111
self-employed 0.502 −1.932 0.419 0.041 0.009
retired −0.482 −0.508 −0.448 0.034 0.017
housewife 0.502 1.396 0.380 0.062 0.085
student −1.373 0.000 −1.476 0.009 0.000
unemployed −0.680 2.037 −0.498 0.047 0.051
other −0.754 −1.333 −0.897 0.095 0.009
scale of incomes 0.096 0.686 0.073 2.195 2.427
financial dissatisfaction −0.348 −0.507 −0.392 5.971 6.103
state of health 0.445 0.230 0.428 3.559 3.479
freedom of choice 0.187 0.328 0.184 6.976 6.974
trust in others 0.026 0.212 0.050 0.533 0.453
index of civicness 0.012 −0.415 −0.008 8.845 9.415
social participation −0.110 0.865 0.011 0.266 0.718
Constant 4.332 7.214 6.941 1.000 1.000
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Table 16: Detailed decomposition of the life satisfaction gap betwen 2001 and 2007 in China for the three
lowest deciles of the income distribution.
satisfaction with life
Differential Explained Unexplained
Prediction 1 6.102∗∗∗
(5.21e + 15)
Prediction 2 5.872∗∗∗
(7.40e + 16)
Difference 0.230∗∗∗
(1.95e + 14)
age 0.0681∗∗ 0.857∗∗∗
(3.18) (39.95)
female 0.00153 0.0557∗∗∗
(1.24) (45.08)
how many children do you have 0.0362∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗
(14.84) (178.70)
mar stat 0.0102 −1.771∗∗∗
(0.62) (−107.07)
empl stat −0.0951∗∗∗ −0.284∗∗∗
(−10.98) (−32.73)
scale of incomes −0.0169∗∗∗ −1.438∗∗∗
(−1201.85) (−102462.93)
soc comparisons 0.0516∗∗∗ 0.967∗∗∗
(7.25) (135.83)
health 0.0343∗∗∗ 0.752∗∗∗
(15.57) (341.60)
freedom choice 0.000277∗∗∗ −0.983∗∗∗
(52.13) (−185222.35)
soc cap 0.00343 3.281∗∗∗
(0.10) (95.84)
Total 0.169 0.0613
(0.92) (0.34)
Constant −2.882∗∗∗
(−8.04e + 12)
Observations 697
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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G Life satisfaction decomposition for the mid-
dle class between 2001 and 2007
Table 17: Coefficients and X-values for 2001 and 2007 in China for the four
intermediate deciles of the income distribution.
β2007 β2001 βref X2007 X2001
age −0.129 −0.074 −0.098 42.965 39.612
age squared 0.001 0.001 0.001 2029.233 1678.606
female −0.003 −0.288 −0.091 0.519 0.494
how many children do you have 0.098 0.022 0.051 1.722 1.791
married 0.975 0.702 0.759 0.826 0.924
living together −0.980 0.000 −1.122 0.006 0.000
divorced 0.301 −0.822 −0.023 0.020 0.012
separated −0.779 0.000 −0.767 0.003 0.000
widowed 0.682 0.379 0.407 0.026 0.018
part time 0.060 −0.516 −0.136 0.096 0.082
self-employed −0.106 0.166 −0.002 0.043 0.009
retired −0.191 0.500 −0.062 0.065 0.009
housewife 0.067 0.593 0.159 0.085 0.068
student −0.358 −4.472 −0.468 0.025 0.003
unemployed 0.219 1.352 0.683 0.022 0.038
other −0.337 0.476 −0.283 0.066 0.012
scale of incomes 0.156 0.065 0.040 4.952 5.221
financial dissatisfaction −0.376 −0.532 −0.477 4.372 5.750
state of health 0.307 0.237 0.294 3.958 3.853
freedom of choice 0.204 0.125 0.163 7.532 7.124
trust in others 0.120 0.328 0.143 0.557 0.559
index of civicness 0.042 0.227 0.034 8.787 9.473
social participation 0.290 0.042 0.082 0.440 0.821
Constant 6.761 5.218 7.010 1.000 1.000
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Table 18: Detailed decomposition of the life satisfaction gap betwen 2001 and 2007 in China for the four
intermediate deciles of the income distribution.
satisfaction with life
Differential Explained Unexplained
Prediction 1 7.282∗∗∗
(9.89e + 15)
Prediction 2 6.324∗∗∗
(6.16e + 15)
Difference 0.959∗∗∗
(7.62e + 14)
age 0.0557∗∗∗ −1.378∗∗∗
(8.06) (−199.32)
female −0.00221 0.143∗∗∗
(−0.65) (41.70)
how many children do you have −0.00353 0.132∗∗∗
(−1.21) (45.38)
mar stat −0.0803∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗
(−5.77) (18.36)
empl stat −0.0396∗∗∗ −0.0400∗∗∗
(−25.83) (−26.10)
scale of incomes −0.0108 0.446∗∗∗
(−0.63) (25.78)
soc comparisons 0.657∗∗∗ 0.758∗∗∗
(6.11) (7.04)
health 0.0310∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗∗
(11.76) (102.22)
freedom choice 0.0667∗∗∗ 0.580∗∗∗
(3.74) (32.47)
soc cap −0.0545 −1.749∗∗∗
(−1.21) (−38.69)
Total 0.642∗∗∗ 0.317∗∗
(6.19) (3.06)
Constant 1.543∗∗∗
(2.33e + 12)
Observations 988
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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H Life satisfaction decomposition for the up-
per class between 2001 and 2007
Table 19: Coefficients and X-values for 2001 and 2007 in China for the three
highest deciles of the income distribution.
β2007 β2001 βref X2007 X2001
age −0.118 −0.092 −0.103 42.331 40.287
age squared 0.001 0.001 0.001 1954.992 1751.591
female 0.092 0.252 0.233 0.620 0.493
how many children do you have 0.039 −0.008 0.029 1.570 1.710
married 1.440 0.572 0.848 0.818 0.880
living together 1.926 2.153 1.864 0.017 0.003
divorced −1.509 0.000 −1.726 0.008 0.000
separated 0.000 −1.687 −1.991 0.000 0.003
widowed 1.626 −0.037 0.271 0.033 0.022
part time −0.040 0.341 0.152 0.066 0.092
self-employed −0.562 0.705 0.329 0.033 0.092
retired 0.408 −0.386 −0.463 0.058 0.078
housewife −0.823 0.077 −0.265 0.083 0.056
student −1.382 −0.260 −0.884 0.041 0.008
unemployed 0.122 0.547 0.303 0.041 0.045
other −2.820 −0.734 −1.622 0.074 0.008
scale of incomes −0.362 −0.066 −0.153 7.364 7.838
financial dissatisfaction −0.487 −0.552 −0.518 3.339 4.855
state of health 0.600 −0.050 0.072 4.174 3.816
freedom of choice 0.261 0.239 0.246 8.099 7.315
trust in others −0.042 0.266 0.194 0.521 0.571
index of civicness 0.025 0.094 0.107 8.718 9.431
social participation 0.025 0.166 −0.005 0.545 0.866
Constant 11.333 9.088 9.130 1.000 1.000
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Table 20: Detailed decomposition of the life satisfaction gap betwen 2001 and 2007 in China for the three
highest deciles of the income distribution.
satisfaction with life
Differential Explained Unexplained
Prediction 1 7.926∗∗∗
(3.41e + 15)
Prediction 2 6.950∗∗∗
(1.68e + 16)
Difference 0.976∗∗∗
(4.17e + 14)
age 0.0145 −1.278∗∗∗
(0.69) (−60.92)
female 0.0296∗∗∗ −0.0968∗∗∗
(10.25) (−33.53)
how many children do you have −0.00405 0.0798∗∗∗
(−0.75) (14.70)
mar stat −0.0328∗∗ 0.780∗∗∗
(−1.97) (46.78)
empl stat −0.158∗∗∗ −0.255∗∗∗
(−3.74) (−6.03)
scale of incomes 0.0725 −2.217∗∗∗
(1.22) (−37.35)
soc comparisons 0.785∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗∗
(10.03) (3.45)
health 0.0257 2.670∗∗∗
(0.37) (38.56)
freedom choice 0.193∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗
(21.26) (19.34)
soc cap −0.0842∗∗ −0.882∗∗∗
(−2.27) (−23.81)
Total 0.951∗∗∗ 0.0252∗∗∗
(129.84) (3.44)
Constant 2.245∗∗∗
(3.09e + 12)
Observations 480
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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I Factor analysis for the index of civicness
In the pooled sample, factor loadings range from .72 to .80 thus suggesting
that the four variables contribute equally to the definition of civic cooper-
ation. The picture does not change much when observing results wave by
wave. In this case, factor loadings stay approximately constant across waves.
The slight variability among factor loadings both in the pooled sample
and within waves support the decision to build an aggregated index of civic
cooperation resulting from the average of the four items.
Table 21: Factor loading and unique variances for the pooled sample
Factor1 Psi
justifiable: claiming government benefits .7354614 .4590965
justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport .7844583 .3846252
justifiable: cheating on taxes .8061527 .3501179
justifiable: someone accepting a bribe .7274631 .4707974
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Table 22: Factor loadings and unique variances across waves
wave 1 Factor1 Psi
justifiable: claiming government benefits .7966403 .3653643
justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport .834389 .303795
justifiable: cheating on taxes .7776205 .3953064
justifiable: someone accepting a bribe .6871919 .5277673
wave 2 Factor1 Psi
justifiable: claiming government benefits .6669682 .5551534
justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport .7524343 .4338426
justifiable: cheating on taxes .7656387 .4137974
justifiable: someone accepting a bribe .5649274 .6808571
wave 3 Factor1 Psi
justifiable: claiming government benefits .6884222 .5260749
justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport .7724496 .4033216
justifiable: cheating on taxes .7844648 .384615
justifiable: someone accepting a bribe .6200904 .6154879
wave 4 Factor1 Psi
justifiable: claiming government benefits .7373559 .4563062
justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport .7846328 .3843513
justifiable: cheating on taxes .8119551 .3407289
justifiable: someone accepting a bribe .7871107 .3804567
wave 5 Factor1 Psi
justifiable: claiming government benefits .7772684 .3958539
justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport .8067852 .3490976
justifiable: cheating on taxes .8470783 .2824584
justifiable: someone accepting a bribe .7956081 .3670077
wave 6 Factor1 Psi
justifiable: claiming government benefits .7613381 .4203643
justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport .7248758 .474555
justifiable: cheating on taxes .8180381 .3308137
justifiable: someone accepting a bribe .7286719 .4690373
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J List of groups and associations mentioned
in the WVS/EVS questionnaire
Respondents were asked to mention whether they belonged or were perform-
ing unpaid voluntary work for any of the following list of associations:
• social welfare service for elderly;
• religious organization;
• education, arts, music or cultural activities;
• labour unions;
• political parties;
• local political actions;
• human rights;
• conservation, the environment, ecology, animal rights;
• conservation, the environment, ecology;
• animal rights;
• professional associations;
• youth work;
• sports or recreation;
• women’s group;
• peace movement;
• organization concerned with health;
• consumer groups;
• other groups.
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